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Trends towards amore participatory agenda in policy-relevant science imply that the roles andwork tasks of scientists becomemoremultifaceted.
In Europe, the increaseduse ofmultiannual plans creates a need for fishery scientists to contributewith their expertise in awide variety of situations.
We identify and characterize four roles for scientists as developers, reviewers, judges, and messengers in arenas where management plans are
produced and evaluated. Using examples of producing and evaluating management plans for pelagic fish stocks in Europe, we present different
scientific roles and how theymay intertwine. The examples illustrate that fishery scientists increasingly interact with advisory councils and industry
stakeholders when performing roles as developers and messengers. The roles as reviewers and judges are typically affiliated with evaluation pro-
cesses carried out under the auspices of the marine science and advisory organization International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES). While it may be difficult to separate the roles in practice, we argue that it must be emphasized to be aware of their different requirements
to ensure that scientific credibility is not compromised. By asking the question “What hat are you wearing?”, we encourage individual fishery scien-
tists, their employers, and ICES as anetworkorganizationof expertise to reflecton roles, affiliations,mandates, andpossible consequences ofwearing
different “hats”.
Keywords: common fisheries policy, credibility, fisherymanagement, fishery science, institutions, legitimacy, science–policy interface, stakeholder
participation, transparency.
Introduction
The role of science in society is changing and, therefore, so is the role
of scientific institutions (Gibbons et al., 1994; Latour, 1998; Latour,
1999; Nowotny et al., 2001; van der Sluijs et al., 2008; Gluckman,
2014). Individual scientists are affected by this change. Formal
and informal conventions have developed through a history to
shape expectations about how a scientist should act. According to
Robert Merton’s classical “ethos of science” (Merton, 1996), good
science is guided by the principles of universalism, communism,
disinterestedness, and organized scepticism. These norms corres-
pond to a view that science is at its best when it is not disturbed—
or “corrupted”—by external influences, and reflects the ideal of
science as an “independent republic” (Polanyi, 1962). If it ever
was, however, science is no longer pursued in isolated academic
“ivory towers ”.Moreopen anddiverse forms of knowledge produc-
tion have emerged, captured by the concepts “mandated science”
(Jasanoff, 1990), “Mode 2 science” (Gibbons et al., 1994; Gibbons,
2000), and “Post-Normal Science” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993).
In contrast to viewing science as a value-free, curiosity-driven,
and an independent pursuit of knowledge, these concepts refer to
types of scientific knowledge production that result from a closer
interaction with public and private interests in society. Such
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interests have an increasingly important role indefiningwhat is tobe
researched and how research is carried out. The development can be
noted through, for example, the consolidated role of research
funding agencies (Rip, 1994), privately funded and prioritized re-
search (Rabeharisoa and Callon, 2002), and the active merging of
different types of knowledge fromawider pool of experts, including
citizens and stakeholders, as denoted by the term “participatory re-
search” (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995). These trends lead to the for-
mation of new operational spaces where societal and scientific
problems are framed and defined, and solutions negotiated
(Metze, 2010).
In this Food for Thought article, we draw attention to implica-
tions of these societal trends towards more diverse forms of knowl-
edge production in the context of fishery scientists and the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). ICES
is an international organization that develops science and advice
to support the sustainable use of the oceans (www.ices.dk). ICES
provides scientific advice to its 20 member countries and to client
commissions and plays a key role in the science–policy landscape
in Europe [see Stange et al. (2012) for a description of the ICES or-
ganizational structure and function].
We use the development of management plans for pelagic fish
stocks in Europe to illustrate how individual scientists and ICES
get involved in various roles as such plans proceed from idea
towards implementation. We identify and describe four roles: the
developer, the reviewer, the judge, and the messenger. Our interest
in this topic emerged within the ICES Working Group on Marine
Systems (WGMARS) when this group was tasked with analysing
management strategy evaluations and management procedures.
WGMARS’ investigations shed light on the diversity of practices
in such contexts regarding stakeholder participation, quality assur-
ance, and documentation of procedures. In this article, we focus on
themultiple roles takenonby individual scientists inwork related to
developing and evaluatingmanagement plans anddrawattention to
possible tensions and conflict of interest thatmight occur. Theword
“hat” is used here as ametaphor for many different possible combi-
nations of roles, tasks, affiliations, and mandates a scientist might
have (Figure 1). The hat metaphor is commonly heard when
fishery scientists in Europe request, state, or communicate a clarifi-
cationof the role an individual takesonwhenengaging in adebate or
a collaboration, raising the question “What hat are youwearing?” or
making statements such as “I amwearing the hat of . . .”, followedby
the scientist’s institutional affiliation, sometimes combined with
further specification of a mandate or a task.
Our aimwith this article is twofold. First, we argue that itmust be
emphasized that institutions, such as ICES, which deliver scientific
advice for policy, are aware of, and reflect on, how their operations
are affected by societal changes that influence how science is pro-
duced and used in support of planning or policy-making. It must
be emphasized that it is not the trend towards more participatory
knowledge production per se that causes potential tensions or con-
flict of interest for scientists invarious roles. It is, for example, always
good practice for scientists to be transparent about their funding
sources and never good practice to ask scientists to review their
own work. These issues need to be addressed in all scientific pro-
cesses and are not unique to participatory research efforts or to
the making of management plans. Our second aim is to highlight
andacknowledge the efforts of fishery scientists in the ICES commu-
nity who have explored new territory by responding to calls for par-
ticipatory knowledge production. Their experiences are valuable
and can inspire others who are challenged to take on similar tasks.
Data to inform this Food for Thought article were obtained
through interviews, document review, and observations in Pelagic
Advisory Council meetings during 2014. Interviews (n ¼ 10) were
conducted betweenNovember 2013 andDecember 2014with scien-
tists who had hands-on experience with the production of fishery
management plans for pelagic stocks in European waters.
Interviewees were asked to tell their story how the plans evolved
and to reflect on their own roles. ICES expert group reports [ICES
Expert Group reports are available at http://www.ices.dk (accessed
6 October 2015).] and minutes from meetings of the Pelagic
Advisory Council [minutes from meetings of the Pelagic Advisory
Council are available at http://www.pelagicac.org/ (accessed 6
October 2015).] provided further information on timelines and
key issues.
We proceed as follows. In the section on “Roles in making man-
agement plans, roles of scientists within the context of developing
and evaluating fishery management plans in Europe are described”.
The section on “Case descriptions” introduces two case studies of
scientists involved in the development of such plans and highlights
dilemmas and tensions that might occur. In the “Discussion”
section, we discuss how roles develop and implications of the mul-
tiple and shifting roles for scientific knowledge production.We con-
clude in the “Food for further thought” sectionwith somequestions
and recommendations to stimulate further reflection and discus-
sion within the ICES community.
Roles in making management plans
Multiannual plans were introduced in the 2002 reform of the
European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to move towards
longer time perspectives on management. The desired characteris-
tics of such plans were outlined:
Figure 1. The individual on the left is pondering the plurality of roles
that can confront scientistswhoareworkingonpolicy-relevant science.
On the right is a hat stand. Each hat represents ametaphor for the roles
themselves. In our definition, roles are dictated by the combination of
mandates, affiliations, and work tasks that come together to create
different hats. In this illustration, we see depictions of a developer’s
construction hat, a judge’swig, and amessenger’s cap as representations
of three of the roles we describe in this article. Illustration by J. Mariano
Collantes Alegre.
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. . . multi-annual plans should establish targets for sustainable
exploitation of the stocks concerned, contain harvesting rules
layingdown themanner inwhichannual catch and/orfishing
effort limits are to be calculated and provide for other specific
management measures, taking account also of the effect on
other species. (Council, 2002, p. L358/59)
Overviews compiled by the ICES Workshop on Guidelines for
Management Strategy Evaluations (ICES, 2013) highlight that a di-
versity of actors and practices are involved in the production and
evaluation of elements that form parts of such plans. Developing
quota-setting mechanisms—specifically; harvest control rules—
became the key component of the plans developed to the extent
that harvest control rules and management plans are sometimes
used as synonyms. In its 2013 reformed version (EU, 2013), the
CFP again promotes the use of multiannual plans as a management
tool to meet overall policy objectives:
Multiannual plans shall be adopted as a priority, based on sci-
entific, technical and economic advice, and shall contain con-
servation measures to restore and maintain fish stocks above
levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield.
(Article 9-1)
Furthermore, regarding the content of such plans,
A multiannual plan shall include: a) the scope, in terms of
stocks, fishery and the area to which the multiannual plan
shall be applied; b) objectives . . . c) quantifiable targets . . .
d) clear time-frames to reach the quantifiable targets; e) con-
servation reference points . . . f) objectives for conservation
and technical measures; g) safeguards to ensure that quanti-
fiable targets are met, as well as remedial action, where
needed . . .. (Article 10-1)
These developments will have implications on how future requests
for science and advice related to management plans are formulated
as well as on the associatedwork tasks to be carried out by scientists.
Based on scientists’ experiences with plans produced before the
reform, we here identify and describe four roles that they take on
when producing and evaluating management plans: the developer,
the reviewer, the judge, and themessenger.
The principal task for the developer is to make a plan that meets
the client’s needs and that also adheres to the general objectives of
fishery management (e.g. the CFP). The role of the developer is
thus akin to that of an engineer who provides technology develop-
ment services to clients while ensuring that legal requirements or
product standards are met. The call to engage in development
work can reach the scientist via ICES, triggered by a client request
to ICES from, for example, the European Commission or an ICES
member country. The request can also come to the scientist directly
from stakeholder groups such as the Advisory Councils or individ-
ual fishing industry organizations. An interviewee who assisted the
Pelagic Advisory Council with developing a management plan for
Western horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) in 2007 (Clarke
et al., 2007; Hegland and Wilson, 2009) explained his role in this
context:
They (the industry) said: ‘This is what we want. Would you
help us write it?’ So, what they asked us to do was to
provide some translation of their needs into the normal lan-
guage of fisheries science. . . .. While we (the scientists) didn’t
have any specific objectives with regards to the yield of the
(western horse mackerel) plan, we would have represented
the minimum criteria that needed to be adhered to with
regards to the sustainability of any fishery which would be
prosecuted on the stock. So, we had a kind of an ancillary
role in setting the objectives. (Interview, Scientist A)
Scientists’ reflections illustrate that the work tasks associated with
the developer’s role are not limited to developing a quota-setting
mechanism. In this case, multiple iterations between scientists and
stakeholders were needed to formulate objectives that guided the
more technical aspects of the development work.
The second role is the reviewer. As a reviewer, the scientist is asked
to critically examine and comment on work done by others. The
well-known procedure for quality assurance within science, that is
peer review, can be seen as a general model for this role
(Bornmann, 2011). Various peer-review practices apply within the
ICES advisory system, depending on whether the request concerns
recurring or non-recurring advice. ICES also provides review ser-
vices for research conducted outside ICES. This involves selecting
qualified experts without a vested interest to provide reviews
(ICES, 2015, p. 3). Given that management plans are developed in
a variety of ways, there is not one standardized review procedure
that applies to such plans within the ICES system.
The third role is the judge. The judge is typically called upon in
response to a specific request from a client (i.e. a fishery manage-
ment authority such as the European Commission). The judge is
asked—in our examples under the institutional capacity of
ICES—to assess whether a management plan is consistent with
themanagement objectives definedby the client. Theoutcome is ex-
emplified in this generic formulation of ICES advice as a response to
such a request: “ICES has evaluated the plan and concludes that it is
in accordance with the precautionary approach and the ICES
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) framework”. [See Lassen et al.
(2014) for a historical overview of how the precautionary approach
and theMSYframeworkhavebeen integrated into the ICESadvisory
context.]
The fourth role is the messenger. As a messenger, the scientist
needs to disseminate, clarify, or give a detailed account of scientific
advice. For example, the scientist can be tasked with explaining to
the European Commission or to an Advisory Council why a man-
agement plan is deemed precautionary or not by ICES. An inter-
viewee reflected on how the work task of the messenger in
interaction with stakeholders has evolved favourably over the last
15 years:
Presenting fisheries advice in the late 1990s to the fishing in-
dustrywasnot apleasant experience. It is completely different
today. [You do not dread it. . . .]. We have come a long ways.
(Interview, Scientist B)
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ICES and the
European Commission specifies that recurrent advice from ICES
will be presented to the Advisory Councils by ICES staff or scientists.
[AGREEMENT In the form of a MoU between the European
Union and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(p. 11). http://www.ices.dk/exploreus/Documents/Cooperation%
20agreements/EU/2015_EU_ICES_MOU_web.pdf (accessed 6
October 2015).] In this context, the idealized role for the messenger
is similar to that of diplomat who is instructed to deliver an official
message to representatives of a foreign government. It is neither up
tothemessenger tochangedetailsof thedecisionnor tocommunicate
agreementordisagreementwith it.The roleof themessenger is simply
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to communicate decisions made elsewhere, to explain underlying
reasons, and to respond to questions (in so far this does not under-
mine the intent of the message being communicated). In reality,
however, the messenger sometimes gets entangled in political pro-
cesses that override the simple mandate of disseminating the
outcomeof scientificwork.An interviewee recalled howan invitation
to present a management plan proposal developed by an ICES
Working Group to an international meeting ended up not going
through:
The [non-EU country] chairman refused to accept the presenta-
tion on the management plan, because [the Chair] wanted to
make a public statement that they were not having the
(European) Commission telling them what to do. This was the
first time I had actually hit such a public political problem. It
was a bit of a shock. (Interview, Scientist B)
This scientist’s experience may serve as a reminder that production
and dissemination of science for advice at the science–policy inter-
face may become entangled in political agendas.
Case descriptions
In this section, two case studies are presented to highlight the diver-
sity of roles of fishery scientists at work producing and evaluating
management plans and to illustrate roles taken on by ICES. The
Northeast Atlantic (NEA)mackerel (Scomber scombrus) case exem-
plifies a situation where
ICES receives a request from a client to provide advice on long-
term management strategies for a stock that is shared between the
EU and coastal states. The North Sea horse mackerel case illustrates
the involvement of fishery scientists and ICES in a setting where in-
dustry stakeholders take an initiative to make fishery management
plans.
NEA mackerel
Thefishery formackerel in theNEA is a highly valuable for anumber
of European countries. It is a shared stock between EU and non-EU
coastal states, and management decisions about the size and distri-
bution of quotas need to be negotiated between the competent au-
thorities. The sharing arrangement is disputed and has triggered
long-lasting conflicts. A request from the European Commission
to ICES in 2007 regarding this stock illustrates a situation where
several roles were called for:
ICES is requested to identifymulti-annual plansof the follow-
ing form, and assuming that egg surveys ofmackerel continue
on a tri-annual basis: [detailed description of the criteria].
ICES is asked to identify combinations of values for [para-
meters] that would assure management of the mackerel
stock that would conform to the precautionary approach
i.e. a low risk of stock depletion, stable catches and sustained
high yield. [. . .]. ICES are also invited to suggest other
approaches to the multi-annual management of mackerel
on its own initiative. (ICES, 2008a, p.1)
An ICES ad hoc expert group was established to deal with this
request (ICES, 2008b). Several of the scientists engaged to carry
out the work had recently been involved in the ICES Study
Group on Management Strategies (SGMAS) 2006–2008, and
were eager to put the outcomes to use. The SGMAS had high-
lighted the importance of interaction between scientists, stake-
holders, and managers at an early stage in a development
process “to get some understanding of needs and preferences, and
communicate possibilities, limitations and tradeoffs” (ICES, 2007,
p. 31). However, there were no established routines within ICES
on how to organize a participatory process in such a setting, and
this added another learning-by-doing aspect to the challenge at
hand. At the outset of the NEA mackerel plan development
work, stakeholders and managers were invited to discuss priorities
and options with the scientists. The developers then proceeded to
explore a number of strategies, using simulations. They acknowl-
edged the need to keep the roles of developing and evaluating
management strategies separate and emphasized in their report
how far they as developers had been able to take the process:
This document describes the technical basis and the results
from the simulations in order that they may be evaluated by
ACOM (the ICES Advisory Committee), and provide an
answer to the EU request. (ICES, 2008a, p. 2)
They also highlighted that development work needs to be guided by
objectives:
It shouldbe recognized that these simulations,while theymay
form the basis for a putative management plan, do not in
themselves constitute such plan. If a management plan is to
be developed, it will require a clarification of objectives, and
a full consideration of review period, performance monitor-
ing, and actions to be taken in exceptional circumstances.
This will require further interaction with stakeholders.
(ICES, 2008a, p. 2)
In reply to the request, ACOM acted as a judge and informed the
European Commission that “any of the types of harvest control
rules (developed) would be consistent with the precautionary ap-
proach if the appropriate parameters were incorporated within
the harvest control rule” (ICES, 2008a, p.1). Following the 2008 de-
velopment work, a management plan was negotiated and agreed
between the EU, Norway, and the Faroe Islands. However, this
plan was never formally applied because of disputes between the
three coastal states and Iceland and Greenland around access to
the NEA mackerel stock. In 2014, the three coastal states issued
another request to ICES to evaluate potential elements of a new
management plan for this stock. A workshop was organized by the
ICES Secretariat to deal with this request (ICES, 2014a). Scientists
assigned roles as co-chairs used their network to identify potential
participantswho could provide relevant information. An interview-
ee commented:
We deliberatively chose also people who had been involved
with the evaluation of the current management plan to be
in the group. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel, because
they did a lot of work on this already. (There were) really
good people doing it the last time. (Interview, Scientist C)
This pragmatic approach to getting people with the desired compe-
tence to contribute to the workshop is not sensitive to any possible
vested interests among the participants. Two scientists attended the
workshop with explicit roles as reviewers. Their mandate is spelled
out in the annex to the report produced: “The process of the
review of this type in ICES, is that: i) the reviewers attend the work-
shop, ii) reviewers comments are takenonboard during the process;
and iii) the report reflects theworkof the experts and the implemen-
tation of the reviewers’ recommendations” (ICES 2014a, p. 118).
This review procedure makes the roles of developers and reviewers
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somewhat blurred as the contributions made by the reviewers are
not known to anyonewhowasnot present. Stakeholderswith indus-
try affiliations fromEUcountries also attended theworkshop. Some
of them had attended previous meetings with similar agenda items
as scientists with ICES or national research institute affiliations, ex-
emplifying the need for all participants to clarify their “hats” and to
declare any possible conflict of interest.
North Sea horse mackerel
In2013, an industry stakeholderorganization in thefishery forhorse
mackerel in the North Sea asked a national research institute to
develop a multiannual management plan to ensure sustainable ex-
ploitation of this stock. The industry’s interest in a management
planwas triggered by the fact that ICESwas implementing a new ap-
proach to advice for “data limited” stocks (ICES, 2012). With only
landings data available to inform advice, ICES considered North
Sea horse mackerel a Category 5 (data limited) stock, a status
which would imply a 20% reduction in advice on total allowable
catch as part of the ICES Data Limited Stock approach. In addition
to having a management plan developed, the industry organization
was, therefore, also eager to enhance availability of data and fill
knowledge gaps in ways that would allow the stock to move up the
ICES stock category “ladder” (Coers and Miller, 2014).
The industry–science collaboration acquired funding, and a
small project groupwas assembled. The group was chaired by a rep-
resentative of the fishery industry organization acting as the client,
while two national scientists led the scientific work as developers.
One of them was, at the time, chair of the ICES Working Group
on Widely Distributed Stocks (WGWIDE), a role which had made
this scientist familiar with the history and intricacies of the stock
in the context of ICES science and advice. The other scientist had
an extensive network among the industry stakeholders. During
the development stage, both scientists described in our interviews
that they felt they had “national scientist hats” on. However, the en-
gagement with WGWIDE gave one of them a sense of having dual
affiliations, representing both their national institute and ICES.
In April 2013, a kick-off meeting was arranged to discuss avail-
ability and interpretation of data. Industry stakeholders, including
skippers and fleet managers, were invited, as were scientific
experts fromotherEuropean countries.Thenational institute scien-
tists then proceeded with exploratory development work. Progress
reports were presented to the Pelagic Advisory Council in October
2013 and again in February 2014 with the scientists as developers
with national institute affiliations. The exploratory work had been
challenging and many question marks remained. The industry
was eager to make progress towards a finished plan, and the idea
was put forward to have ICES evaluate the proposal produced by
the industry–science collaboration. The owner of the initiative
was the industry organization.
However, neither the industry organization nor the Pelagic
Advisory Council is entitled to send requests to ICES directly; all
requests must go via the European Commission or via an ICES
member country. Therefore, the request to evaluate the proposed
plan for North Sea horse mackerel was submitted to ICES by the
member country’s ministry. In response to the evaluation request,
the ICES Secretariat organized a workshop to review and evaluate
the proposed plan (ICES, 2014b). Two independent reviewers
were recruited, and the two developers were assigned roles as
co-chairs. Theworkshopwas held at the developers’ home institute.
Issues regarding broader participation in the ad hoc workshop had
not been discussed between the ICES Secretariat and the chairs
before the meeting. One of the developers reflected on roles and
work tasks for ICES and for the assigned chairs in this context:
I did not feel responsible for organizing the participatory
process. I assumed throughout the preparations of this
meeting that they (the ICES Secretariat) had extended the
invitations to the stakeholders. [. . .]. Then I found out
maybe four or five days before the meeting that this hadn’t
happened. So I basically stepped out of my role as an
invited expert to ICES, or as invited Chair, by inviting the in-
dustry organization, saying: ‘Hey, this meeting is going on.
I’m sure that it is intended to be an open meeting. You can
participate! Are you coming?’. (Interview, Scientist, D)
In the workshop, the two invited scientists served as both reviewers
and judges. However, because the results from the exploratory ana-
lyses showed that the proposed management plan would not meet
precautionary criteria, the meeting turned into a discussion
among peers on alternative, more appropriate management
approaches, using the technical background document as a basis.
Based on the reviewers’ feedback, the developers completed the tech-
nical document, including a number of recommendations forman-
agement of the stock in the short term. The outcome of the
workshop was then discussed in an ICES Advice Drafting Group
meeting in which the task was to formulate a reply to the request
from the ICES member country. One of the developers was called
in as an expert in this group of judges. Asked to reflect on the mul-
tiple roles and work tasks, the scientist commented:
I don’t think we wanted to be the people doing the work and
thepeople reviewing it, butwedid in awayendupbeing that. I
was a participant in the Advice Drafting Group. I didn’t ac-
tively push particular perspectives, because the data was
speaking for itself and I was obviously in agreement with
(the Advice Drafting Group Chair) and other people about
what we should be saying. (Interview, Scientist E)
An update with focus on the industry–science project work was pre-
sented to thePelagicAdvisoryCouncil in July 2014, againwith the sci-
entist as a developerwearing a “national institute hat”. The review and
evaluation process going on within ICES was not mentioned during
the presentation. Instead, the focus of the message was on the bad
news: no precautionary harvest control rule could be suggested. An
interviewee commented on being a developer in this situation:
You can change howyou look at amanagement plan or a rule,
but you are still maintaining the same scientific guideline of
what is precautionary. You are just trying to find—within
that precautionary space—what is the most acceptable
thing for the stakeholders and play around with that.
Unfortunately, that precautionary space was very small. I
really would have been a lot happier if the stock had been
doing well. I think it would have been a really nice exercise,
but it didn’t quite work out that way. (Interview, Scientist, E)
The scientist’s reflection highlights that there is not always an
acceptable science-based solution to be found to the problem at
hand; the exploratory modelling work could not produce any
precautionary harvest control rules that were acceptable to the
reviewers and judges. The developer could thus not deliver the
outcome that the industry had hoped for when they initiated the in-
dustry–science collaboration. At this point, the industry–science
project had come to an end; however, the process of assessing the
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status of theNorth Sea horsemackerel stock and advising on catches
continued within the ICES advisory system. When ICES (2015)
catch advice for this stock was to be presented to the Pelagic
Advisory Council in October 2014, one of the developers was
offered to take on yet another role—that of themessenger. The sci-
entist declined:
I didn’t want to! (laughter) It seemed like I was just wearing
too many hats there. I had already presented to them a
couple of times—told them what we were doing and what
we had looked at. And then I didn’t want to come back and
say: ‘This is the advice’. I felt it would have more gravitas
with the group if somebody from ICESwas there—an official
ICES person—to present the results. (Interview, Scientist, E)
The scientist had already worked on the North Sea horse mackerel
issue as a developer. The scientist engaged in the issue again together
with the reviewers in the review workshop, and together with the
judges in the Advice Drafting Group. When offered the role of the
messenger, this scientist encountered all four roleswehave previous-
ly described. ICES advice on catches for North Sea horse mackerel
for 2015 ended up being presented to the Pelagic Advisory
Council by one of the ICESACOMvice chairs, who in this situation
was amessenger with an ICES affiliation.
Discussion
The two cases presented in the section on “Case descriptions” give
glimpses into how the work of scientists is influenced as fishing in-
dustry stakeholders and the Advisory Councils increasingly engage
in knowledge production processes aimed at underpinning fisheries
management decisions inEurope. The cases also showhowmanage-
ment plan evaluation requests to ICES trigger a need for clear pro-
cedures and clarification of mandates associated with various roles.
When acting in roles as developers in the cases described here,
scientists encountered settings where they needed to communicate
efficientlywith non-scientific audienceswhendiscussing objectives,
priorities, and trade-offs. When development work is financed by
the fishing industry, the industry’s stakes increase, and it is under-
standable if they express disappointment if their goals cannot be
met. One can speculate that it is more personally satisfying for a sci-
entist to deliver outputs thatmeet the goals set and that can be put to
use in the process towards implementation of sustainable manage-
ment measures. Scientists, however, are expected to be “disinterest-
ed” from a Mertonian view of the role of science and not let their
work be influenced by any pressure to arrive at a particular conclu-
sion. In the interest of scientific credibility, it thus becomes crucial
that the process is transparent and allows review of the steps that
achieved the results.
The role of the reviewer is also present in the cases described in
this article, although somewhat blurred. When the role of ICES is
to evaluate amanagement plan, the evaluation processes sometimes
involve development, review, and judging elements. ICES review
procedures have evolved during the period studied here, and
some different practices are being explored. The fact that the devel-
opers in the North Sea horse mackerel case were assigned roles as
chairs of the workshop where the development work was evaluated
raisesquestionsas to the extent this reviewprocess canbe considered
“independent”, andwhether the review is “internal” or “external”. A
review group may at times find itself in a situation where different
interpretations are asserted and contested by different individuals.
The maintenance of external credibility of the scientific work thus
warrants a more formalized procedure set-up to establish the inde-
pendence of the review process. In Europe, a practical limitation to
establishing an independent reviewprocess relates to the fact that the
pool of fishery scientists with competence to carry out thework task
called for in the settings described above is small. Only a limited
number of scientists have in-depth knowledge of particular bio-
logical operating models, data sources, methods, and stocks. The
interconnectedness of fishery scientists contributes to a lackof com-
petent “independent” alternatives (Finlayson, 1994). This dilemma
highlights the need for strategic planning in ICES Member
Countries. It also highlights the need for scientists to reflect on
their role, interests, and stakes when participating in settings
where their own work is up for evaluation, and when acting as a
reviewer in a group of peers.
The work task for the judge in the context of evaluatingmanage-
ment plans depends on the evaluation criteria. In the examples
described above, the focus was on judging whether a management
plan—ormore specifically, a harvest control rule—could be consid-
ered precautionary or not. The process of producing management
plans for stocks and fisheries in Europe is not standardized. To
date, plans have focused on single stocks, and harvest control rules
have been central components. Future management plans in
Europe are likely tohave other key components, reflecting the objec-
tives of the recently reformed CFP, the legal requirements of
co-decision procedures, and the resulting priorities of managers
in the European Commission (EC, 2014). With changing manage-
ment priories, operationalization by ICES of the criteria to be eval-
uated scientifically will need to adapt as well. The role of the judge
will still be needed, but the work to be carried out is likely to
become more diverse.
The role of the messenger has evolved in terms of the work task
involved. There are probably several factors that contribute to the
positive development regarding interactions between scientists and
stakeholders. ICES has attempted to become a more open organiza-
tion. For example, observers are now welcome to workshops within
the ICESadvisoryprocess. [How to join the advisoryprocess as stake-
holderobserver:http://www.ices.dk/community/advisory-process/
Pages/How-to-join-the-advisory-process.aspx (accessed 6 October
2015).] “Opening the box” training courses organized by ICES have
made stock assessment and fisheries advice more accessible for non-
scientific audiences, including fishing industry stakeholders, NGOs,
managers, and policy-makers. Meetings between ICES and the
Advisory Councils [so-called MIRAC (before RAC’s name change)
and MIACO meetings] have been arranged annually since 2006 as a
high-level forum for interaction and exchange. Several of the industry
representatives who hold seats on the Advisory Councils have been
involved in projects and collaborations with fishery scientists and
havebecomefamiliarwith the intricaciesof the science thatunderpins
ICES advice. As a result of increased interactions between industry
representatives, fishery scientists, and the ICES advisory process, the
presentation of official ICES advice no longer comes out of a “black
box”. The reasons why the advice looks like it does are often already
known to the stakeholder representatives whose constituencies will
be most affected by the advice in question. Discussions in settings
where the scientist is in amessenger role can, therefore, focus on clar-
ifications, as well as be opportunities for expressing frustrations, or
sometimes agreement, with the advice provided.
Food for further thought
The trend towards a more participatory agenda in European fisher-
ies management and towards a more prevalent use of multiannual
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plans implies that the roles and work tasks of fishery scientists in
Europewill becomemoremultifaceted.Our examples fromthepro-
duction of management plans for pelagic fish stocks illustrate that
the various roles intertwine at several points. To stimulate further re-
flection, we ask what is the role of scientists in arenas where the
general objectives outlined in theCFPneed to be translated into spe-
cific, operational management tools? In what ways does the setting
change if the development work is financed by the industry?Whose
responsibility is it to organize and facilitate a participatory process
when ICES receives a request to develop or evaluate a management
plan? How can transparency and scientific credibility be ensured
when scientists get involved in processes where their own work is
evaluated? The scientists who contributed with their experiences
in this study have been actively involved in participatory processes
with industry stakeholders, some on multiple occasions. These
engagements had led them to reflect on their own various roles
and affiliations. They expressed sensitivity to the presence of differ-
ent mandates as well as to the requirements and expectations asso-
ciated with them.
The responsibility to ensure that different scientific roles are
acted out in an adequate and transparent manner resides at a top
level as well as a an individual level. While institutions frame,
guide and supervise individual actions, individuals are responsible
for that their own actions are in accordance with established
norms. Accordingly we, suggest two main types of approaches to
address the issue of tensions and overlaps between different roles:
(i) increased formalization of procedures of roles and mandates
and (ii) enhanced reflective capacity and role communication.
The following approaches are generic in their applicability outside
the scientific advisory institution of ICES and even outside the
field of fisheries science.
Increased formalization
With a basis in Mertonian norms of science, this approach seeks to
organize for an independent and credible scientific process, shel-
tered from vested interests and political bias. Concretely, the ap-
proach sets out to eliminate the potential for role overlaps and
conflicts of interest through institutional and organizational
change. For example, this could imply that a scientist who has
acted as a developer in relation to a management plan cannot be
accepted as a reviewer or a judge in relation to the same plan.
Pushed to its limits, this approach might imply that a researcher
can only hold one role relative to a given development or advisory
process. Furthermore, the possibility for the industry, or other non-
governmental parties, to fund research in support of amanagement
plan should be welcomed as an element in a participatory agenda,
but must be associated with a transparent and independent review
process. As we indicated previously, however, there are practical
concerns that constrain the extent towhich the strategyof formaliza-
tion can be pursued as a means to maintain transparency in the ad-
visory process. Importantly, there are resource constraints as the
pool of fishery scientists with the required skills in a given area is
limited, which creates pressure for individuals to take on multiple
roles. This fact underscores the necessity of the transparent dialogue
with clients of science and advice and the adoption of methods of
responsible research and innovation in the following point.
Enhanced reflective capacity and role communication
This approach has a different normative basis which recognizes that
advisory science, in the context of post-normal science in particular
(Dankel et al., 2012), is embedded in value judgments. Strictly
speaking, this implies that science cannot be fully “disinterested”
and “independent”. This perspective implies that transparency
and scientific legitimacy in the context of policy-relevant science
cannot alone be met through formalization, as described above. In
Europe and elsewhere, a shift from centralized fisheries manage-
ment to more inclusive forms of governance has led to new types
of engagement with science. [Participatory research, fishery-
dependent research, and industry-contracted research (The cross-
cutting Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) platform of
the EU Framework Program for Research and Innovation
“Horizon 2020”; Owen et al., 2012; von Schomberg, 2013) are
part and parcel of the effort to align science and society to help
earn trust and aid the utmost credibility, legitimacy, and transpar-
ency of science and advice.] Taken together, there are many roles
to be filled by a limited number of qualified experts. Maintaining
the legitimacy and credibility of fisheries science in the context of
a multiplicity of roles will benefit from continued and perhaps
even enhanced awareness and communication about roles. We,
therefore, suggest a reflexive review of ICES procedures in all areas
of working group and committee membership. Concrete codes of
conduct that guide individual scientists to identify situations
when their credibility is compromised are also recommended.
ICES is a unique institution of continued high relevance for
marine science and centralized advice across European countries.
Our involvement within ICES in the Working Group on Marine
Systems (WGMARS) has helped us identify the institutional and in-
dividual tensions of dynamic and overlapping roles, and we fulfil
our mandate to explore these themes with the food for thought
we provide here. It is our hope that the ICES community will
engage in further discussions on how institutional practices can
provide the optimal field for its network of scientists. By continuing
to ask the question “What hat are you wearing?”, we also encourage
others outside of ICES to reflect on their roles, affiliations, man-
dates, and associated consequences of wearing different “hats”
when participating at the science–policy interface.
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